In historical and ethnographic studies of the making of scientific knowledge, there has been a long-standing fascination with deflating certain stories about objectivity. Among the resources used to achieve that deflation have been the notions of subjectivity, which has been treated more as a trouble for objectivity than as a knowledge-making mode open to systematic study. I describe notions of subjectivity implicated in that inattention; I trace potentially constructive links between contemporary science studies and resources in 18th-century philosophical aesthetics; I draw notice to available engagements with the mode of subjectivity known as taste, and, especially, gustation and olfaction; and I suggest ways in which we might study the achievement of intersubjectivity in these domains.

Over a period of more than 30 years, more than 100 mathematicians worked on a project to classify mathematical objects known as finite simple groups. The Classification, when officially declared completed in 1981, ranged between 300 and 500 articles and ran somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 journal pages. Mathematicians have hailed the project as one of the greatest mathematical achievements of the 20th century, and it surpasses, both in scale and scope, any other mathematical proof of the 20th century. The history of the Classification points to the importance of face-to-face interaction and close teaching relationships in the production and transformation of theoretical knowledge. The techniques and methods that governed much of the work in finite simple group theory circulated via personal, often informal, communication, rather than in published proofs. Consequently, the printed proofs that would constitute the Classification Theorem functioned as a sort of shorthand for and formalization of proofs that had already been established during personal interactions among mathematicians. The proof of the Classification was at once both a material artifact and a crystallization of one community’s shared practices, values, histories, and expertise. However, beginning in the 1980s, the original proof of the Classification faced the threat of ‘uninvention’. The papers that constituted it could still be found scattered throughout the mathematical literature, but no one other than the dwindling community of group theorists would know how to find them or how to piece them together. Faced with this problem, finite group theorists resolved to produce a ‘second-generation proof’ to streamline and centralize the Classification. This project highlights that the proof and the community of finite simple groups theorists who produced it were co-constitutive–one formed and reformed by the other.

Cross-species comparison has long been regarded as a stepping-stone for medical research, enabling the discovery and testing of prospective treatments before they undergo clinical trial on humans. Post-genomic medicine has made cross-species comparison crucial in another respect: the ‘community databases’ developed to collect and disseminate data on model organisms are now often used as a template for the dissemination of data on humans and as a tool for comparing results of medical significance across the human-animal boundary. This paper identifies and discusses four key problems encountered by database curators when integrating human and non-human data within the same database: (1) picking criteria for what counts as reliable evidence, (2) selecting metadata, (3) standardising and describing research materials and (4) choosing nomenclature to classify data. An analysis of these hurdles reveals epistemic disagreement and controversies underlying cross-species comparisons, which in turn highlight important differences in the experimental cultures of biologists and clinicians trying to make sense of these data. By considering database development through the eyes of curators, this study casts new light on the complex conjunctions of biological and clinical practice, model organisms and human subjects, and material and virtual sources of evidence – thus emphasizing the fragmented, localized and inherently translational nature of biomedicine.

That vaccines do not cause autism is now a widely accepted proposition, though a few dissenters remain. An 8-year court process in the US federal vaccine injury compensation court ended in 2010 with rulings that autism was not an adverse reaction to vaccination. There were two sets of trials: one against the measles–mumps–rubella (MMR) vaccine and one against the mercury-based preservative thimerosal. The MMR story is more widely known because of publicity surrounding the main proponent of an MMR–autism link, British doctor Andrew Wakefield, but the story of thimerosal in court is largely untold. This study examines the credibility battles and boundary work in the two cases, illuminating the sustaining world of alternative science that supported the parents, lawyers, researchers, and expert witnesses against vaccines. After the loss in court, the families and their advocates transformed their scientific arguments into an indictment of procedural injustice in the vaccine court. I argue that the very efforts designed to produce legitimacy in this type of lopsided dispute will be counter-mobilized as evidence of injustice, helping us understand why settling a scientific controversy in court does not necessarily mean changing anyone’s mind.

This article examines the challenges and tensions that inhere in university-based boundary organizations. We begin by reconceptualizing the theory of boundary organizations, bringing it into greater alignment with the realities of the current university environment. Using in-depth interviews, documentary analysis and ethnographic field work, this framework is applied to a university-based boundary organization attempting to reconcile the needs of water policymakers, university administrators, university departments, and funding agencies. These stakeholders place diverse, conflicting demands on the boundary organization. Those demands create four sets of enduring tensions requiring ongoing management by the boundary organization. However, the ability to manage these tensions is structured by constituents’ relative levels of power, legitimacy, and saliency. We show the importance of adaptive boundary management for managing these enduring tensions, while also concluding that the demands of some stakeholders may be incommensurable. The article closes with a number of concrete suggestions for enhancing the efficacy of university-based boundary organizations.

The paper explores the role of imagined geographies in the shaping of new technologies. I argue that the role of place in future-oriented visions of technoscience is a neglected topic in studies of the social shaping of technology. The paper proposes an approach that combines the sociology of expectations with the geography of science. It focuses on the interplay between envisaged and current geographies to highlight the recursive dynamics of place and imagination. To illustrate this approach, the paper discusses the example of biopharming, the production of biopharmaceuticals using genetically modified crops. I argue that expectations for biopharming bear the imprint of place, or rather of the places in which they are imagined, as well as those they imagine, and ultimately those they produce. I use this example to suggest how social studies of science and technology can usefully investigate the spaces, places and scales of technological development.

Science is stratified, with an unequal distribution of research facilities and rewards among scientists. Awards and prizes, which are critical for shaping scientific career trajectories, play a role in this stratification when they differentially enhance the status of scientists who already have large reputations: the ‘Matthew Effect’. Contrary to the Mertonian norm of universalism – the expectation that the personal attributes of scientists do not affect evaluations of their scientific claims and contributions – in practice, a great deal of evidence suggests that the scientific efforts and achievements of women do not receive the same recognition as do those of men: the ‘Matilda Effect’. Awards in science, technology, engineering and medical (STEM) fields are not immune to these biases. We outline the research on gender bias in evaluations of research and analyze data from 13 STEM disciplinary societies. While women’s receipt of professional awards and prizes has increased in the past two decades, men continue to win a higher proportion of awards for scholarly research than expected based on their representation in the nomination pool. The results support the powerful twin influences of implicit bias and committee chairs as contributing factors. The analysis sheds light on the relationship of external social factors to women’s science careers and helps to explain why women are severely underrepresented as winners of science awards. The ghettoization of women’s accomplishments into a category of ‘women-only’ awards also is discussed.

Erratum for ‘Models of democracy in social studies of science’ by Darrin Durant

Social Studies of Science 41(5) October 2011 (pp. 691–714). Published Online First 15 August 2011, DOI: 10.1177/0306312711414759. Published in print October 2011.

Since the mid 1960s, researchers in computer science have famously referred to chess as the ‘drosophila’ of artificial intelligence (AI). What they seem to mean by this is that chess, like the common fruit fly, is an accessible, familiar, and relatively simple experimental technology that nonetheless can be used productively to produce valid knowledge about other, more complex systems. But for historians of science and technology, the analogy between chess and drosophila assumes a larger significance. As Robert Kohler has ably described, the decision to adopt drosophila as the organism of choice for genetics research had far-reaching implications for the development of 20th century biology. In a similar manner, the decision to focus on chess as the measure of both human and computer intelligence had important and unintended consequences for AI research. This paper explores the emergence of chess as an experimental technology, its significance in the developing research practices of the AI community, and the unique ways in which the decision to focus on chess shaped the program of AI research in the decade of the 1970s. More broadly, it attempts to open up the virtual black box of computer software – and of computer games in particular – to the scrutiny of historical and sociological analysis.

A prominent feature of biological and biomedical research and therapeutics over the past century is the entanglement of human and other animal bodies in the making and remaking of knowledge, techniques and products. In this paper, we explore how animal models work in two different but interrelated situations: early/mid 20th-century reproductive sciences focused on human biomedicine; and early 21st-century assisted reproduction of endangered animals in zoos. We use the concept of ‘transposition’ to describe and compare how findings about different species, the infrastructures supporting different species and the body parts of different animal species have been mobilized at these sites. We show how such mobilizations create dynamic relationships in organizational, discursive and embodied ways. The two case studies illuminate the changing practices of modelling within the reproductive sciences, and the changing kinds of work animal models have done in those fields.

Feminist STS analyses of contemporary reproductive medicine have illustrated the proliferation of practices that position fetuses as individual subjects, and have highlighted the major implications of such practices for pregnant women. In an attempt to challenge medicine’s claims to ‘know’ the fetus, this body of literature has also demonstrated the renegotiable basis of pregnant/fetal subjectivity, using detailed empirical analyses of the practices through which particular pregnant and fetal subjects emerge in particular contexts. In this paper I contribute to this endeavour utilizing an empirical case study of an important, but neglected aspect of reproductive healthcare: the demarcation of temporal thresholds on abortion provision in the absence of diagnosed fetal abnormality. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with Scottish health professionals, I explore the discursive practices through which they demarcate ‘later’ abortion as a problematic decision. I argue that such practices are intimately dependent on particular co-constructions of temporality and pregnant/fetal subjectivity, and support this argument with reference to the counter-representations of the gestational timing of abortion that emerge from a minority of health professionals’ accounts. I suggest that, collectively, this body of data illustrates the opportunities that (re)presenting temporality would afford those engaged in attempts to foster the construction of less oppressive pregnant/fetal subjectivities. My broader aim is to illustrate the insights that feminist theorizations of pregnant/fetal subjectivity gain from explicit engagement with another important theme of contemporary STS scholarship, namely, the constitutive role played by representations of temporality in technoscientific innovation and practice.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement procedure is a key arena for establishing global legal norms for what counts as relevant knowledge. As a high-profile case, the WTO trade dispute on GMOs mobilized scientific expertise in somewhat novel ways. Early on, the Panel put the dispute under the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement through a new legal ontology; it classified transgenes as potential pests and limited all environmental issues to the ‘plant and animal health’ category. The selection of scientific experts sought a multi-party consensus through a fast adversarial process, reflecting a specific legal epistemology. For the SPS framing, focusing on the defendant’s regulatory procedures, the Panel staged scientific expertise in specific ways that set up how experts were questioned, the answers they would give, their specific role in the legal arena, and the way their statements would complement the Panel’s findings. In these ways, the dispute settlement procedure co-produced legal and scientific expertise within the Panel’s SPS framework. Moreover, the Panel operated a procedural turn in WTO jurisprudence by representing its findings as a purely legal-administrative judgement on whether the EC’s regulatory procedures violated the SPS Agreement, while keeping implicit its own judgements on substantive risk issues. As this case illustrates, the WTO settlement procedure mobilizes scientific expertise for sophisticated, multiple aims: it recruits a source of credibility from the scientific arena, thus reinforcing the standard narrative of ‘science-based trade discipline’, while also constructing new scientific expertise for the main task – namely, challenging trade restrictions for being unduly cautious.

In this paper we examine a volunteer-based sea turtle management project run by the state of North Carolina, USA, to explore collaborative conservation and citizen science. Through this case study, we unpack assumptions from the volunteerism literature and apply theories of co-production to understand how citizens evaluate science and produce knowledge while conducting wildlife monitoring. We demonstrate that the project maintains a healthy give and take between the state and the volunteers as they work together to manage endangered sea turtles. When tensions do emerge over specific issues such as nest relocation, volunteers engage with scientific debates and apply their knowledge gained through the project to push their priorities. While volunteers understand the state’s position on conservation science, they counter with evidence from scientific literature and locally situated observations informed by an alternative view of human–environment relationships and specific goals for the project. Overall, we find that there is little evidence to support the notion that knowledge is ‘co-produced’ in the project. Instead, the combination of volunteer control over the local spaces of conservation and the state’s need for volunteer labor results in the co-production of conservation practice.

Dominant discourses on telecare technologies often celebrate the erasure of distance and place. This paper provides a critical intervention into these discourses by investigating how spaces still matter, despite the move from physical to virtual encounters between healthcare professionals and patients. I argue that science and technology studies (STS) research on telecare, as well as other technologies, can be enriched by including a focus on place to understand the dynamic interactions between people and things. Adopting insights of human geographers, I show how places in which technologies are used affect how technologies enable or constrain human actions and identities. Whereas some spaces may facilitate the incorporation of technologies, others may resist technologies. A focus on how places matter is important for understanding how telecare technologies reorder and redefine healthcare. Although other healthcare technologies are also important actors in transforming healthcare, telecare technologies do this in a very specific way: they redefine the spatial dimensions of healthcare. To capture and further explore this changing spatial configuration of healthcare, I introduce the notion of technogeography of care. This concept provides a useful heuristic to study how places matter in healthcare. Although telecare technologies introduce virtual encounters between healthcare providers and patients, the use of telecare devices still largely depends on locally grounded, situated care acts. Based on interviews with users of several cardiac telecare applications, including healthcare professionals and patients in Germany and the Netherlands, the paper shows how patients’ homes and public spaces are important for shaping the implementation and use of telecare technologies, and vice versa. Last, but not least, telecare devices are implicated as well. The paper emphasizes the place-dependency of the use and meaning of technical devices by showing how the same technological device can do and mean different things in different places.

In this paper we propose a typology of three interpretations of the precautionary principle, each with its associated philosophical and policy implications. We found that these different interpretations of precaution are closely related to variations in the understanding of scientific uncertainty, as well as varying ways of assessing possible (but uncertain) impacts of scientific–technological development. There is a direct link to the question of what scientific knowledge is and what role it plays in regulation and decision-making. The proposed typology permits a conceptual systematization of the current controversies related to the precautionary principle, while facilitating understanding of some of the deeper roots of science and technology policy debates.